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Pragmatism as a Communication-Theoretical Tradition: An Assessment of Craig‘s Pro-
posal
1
 
Abstract. Of recent attempts to appropriate pragmatism for communication studies, Rob-
ert Craig‘s inclusion of a pragmatist ―tradition‖ in his influential ―metamodel‖ of commu-
nication theoriesconstitutes one of the most prominent proposals to date. In this model, 
pragmatism is principally understood by contrast to other alternatives, such as phenome-
nology, semiotics, and rhetoric. As a communication-theoretical tradition in Craig‘s 
sense, the pragmatist approach is expected to provide distinctive articulations of the na-
ture of communication and communication problems, expressed in a particular vocabu-
lary. Useful as such a partitioning may be for analytical and dialogical purposes, the de-
limitation of pragmatism that emerges from Craig‘s efforts is in many respects problemat-
ic. After a summary of the background assumptions and disciplinary aims of Craig‘s pro-
ject, this article identifies three serious weaknesses in his account: its neglect of relevant 
intra-tradition distinctions and debates, its straightforward association of pragmatism with 
a strongly constitutive approach to communication, and its tendency to disconnect prag-
matism from other communication-theoretical positions in ways that are not conducive to 
his objectives. This discussion highlights the contrast between Craig‘s constructionist in-
strumentalism and the habit-realism of the classical pragmatisms of Peirce and Dewey. 
Although pragmatist thought has influenced academic communication studies in a varie-
ty of ways over the last hundred years, it is only of late that distinctively pragmatist ap-
proaches to the field of communication have begun to be properly articulated. Instead of 
taking pragmatist philosophy as merely a secondary source of ideas and tools, several 
communication scholars have endorsed pragmatism as a central communication-theoretical 
perspective in its own right (e.g. Craig 2007; Danisch 2007; Russill 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2007; 2008; Swartz, Campbell and Pestana 2009) – one assumed to be capable of providing 
a fertile general framework for inquiry into contemporary communicative practices.  
Of such attempts to appropriate pragmatism for communication studies, Robert Craig‘s 
(2007) inclusion of a pragmatist tradition in his chart of communication theories
2
 consti-
tutes one of the most prominent proposals to date. Prompted by Chris Russill‘s (2004; 
2005; 2006) reconstruction of pragmatism from a communicative point of view, Craig has 
revised his ―metamodel‖ to include pragmatism as a central tradition in the field. Craig‘s 
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Here, ―communication theory‖ is used as an abbreviation for ―social communication theory‖, and is further-
more restricted to approximately the sense in which Craig employs the term. The broader issue of the proper na-
ture and limits of communication theory is beyond the scope of this brief review. 
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explication is admittedly more schematic and less historically embedded than Russill‘s ap-
propriation; but the former account stands out as a concise attempt to pinpoint the distinc-
tive communication-theoretical contribution of pragmatist thought. The outcome of Craig‘s 
endeavour is a relatively definite articulation of the kernel of pragmatism from a present-
day communication-theoretical point of view. 
Such a demarcation faces a number of difficulties, of which the variety of different 
pragmatist perspectives on the market is probably the most obvious. Given the range of 
pragmatist thought – from the classical pragmatist ideas of Charles Peirce and William 
James to the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty and beyond – any significant delimitation of 
the pragmatist approach is likely to provoke suspicions of narrowness and undue omissions. 
As I will argue, Craig‘s revised metamodel tends to compartmentalise the tradition in a way 
that excludes some of its central characters. However, given Craig‘s systematic objectives, 
simply pointing out that his conception of pragmatism omits this or that figure is not com-
pelling, as he is less concerned with the historical background than he is with moving social 
communication theory – including its purported pragmatist component – forward. It is 
therefore not sufficient to note that Craig‘s approach is selective and restrictive. But if it is 
further shown that these exclusions may be detrimental to attempts to tap the full potential 
of pragmatist thought, and therefore unfavourable to the fruitful development of the com-
munication-theoretical field, the criticism becomes more potent. Consequently, I will here 
be less concerned with questions of historical representation or misrepresentation than with 
the issue of the potential implications of Craig‘s portrayal of pragmatism for the future de-
velopment of communication inquiry. 
This discussion is rendered particularly pertinent by the somewhat volatile state of 
communication studies as a social-scientific specialty
3
. Sometimes viewed as merely a sec-
ondary offshoot of sociology or political science, the communication discipline – if that is 
an appropriate characterisation at all – is marked by self-doubt and periodic ―ferments‖. 
The positive aspect of this situation is a certain receptivity to new theoretical and meta-
theoretical openings; and it is as such that Craig‘s proposal should be viewed and possibly 
criticised. It is likely that the conception of pragmatism sketched in the revised metamodel 
will exert a noticeable influence on how the field of communication theory is presented and 
parsed in textbooks and anthologies of the near future. Thus, what may be at stake in this 
debate is how the very concept ―pragmatism‖ is going to be understood and used in social-
scientific communication studies. 
Yet, it should be noted that Craig‘s primary focus is not the identification and develop-
ment of a pragmatist tradition in communication theory per se, but rather the crafting of a 
constitutive metamodel capable of bringing some focus and genuine cross-paradigm inter-
action to the fledgling communication-theoretical field. Indeed, in the first version of the 
model (Craig 1999), pragmatism does not play any explicit role at all; it is only after 
Russill‘s (2004; 2005) attempts to vindicate pragmatism that Craig expands the original 
seven-tradition matrix of first-order communication theories to include the pragmatist per-
spective in ―Pragmatism in the Field of Communication Theory‖ (2007). Consequently, in 
order to scrutinise the particular shape Craig‘s conception of pragmatism takes, it is neces-
sary to first grasp the motivations behind and the principles emerging from his ambitious 
metamodel project.  
                                                          
3 
This disciplinary association is not self-evident; communication studies tend to spill over into different areas 
of the humanities as well as into technology studies and the like. But as an academic subject, communication in-
quiry is usually classified as a social science. 
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The Constitutive Logic of the Metamodel 
As the name suggests, Craig‘s ―constitutive metamodel‖ strives to construct a second-
order delineation of first-order communication theories. It is driven by the belief that in 
spite of ―the epistemological diversity and currently fragmented state of communication 
theory ... the field can and should achieve a certain dialogical–dialectical coherence by 
adopting a common focus on communication problems in society and debating alternative 
practical approaches‖ (Craig 2007: 125). This is based on the notion that communication is 
a socially constructed practice, while communication theory is ―a practical way of partici-
pating in a societal discourse about the norms of that practice‖ (Craig 2007: 127).  
To a large extent, the metamodel – which might equally well be called a ―metatheory‖, 
as Craig (2001: 232) acknowledges in his response to David Myers‘s criticism – can be 
seen as an extension of Craig‘s conception of the relationship between first-order theory 
and practice. According to this view, the development of a social practice is more or less 
automatically accompanied by a normative discourse, which ―is characterized by specific 
discursive practices, or ways of using language for practical purposes‖ (Craig 2006: 39). 
Such discourse is not a neutral representation of the activity in question; it is a constitutive 
part of the practice, because it articulates standards, norms, techniques, etc., which render 
the activity culturally meaningful as well as capable of social dissemination and regulation. 
Consequently, in this first-order constitutive conception, every theory, ―considered as an 
interpretation of practical knowledge, presents an idealized normative standard for practice‖ 
(Craig 2006: 44). Following James Carey (1989: 32), Craig (2007: 128) contends that every 
model of communication is also a model for communication. But such models or theories 
are themselves higher-order activities, the validity of which depends on the relevance and 
value of the ideal forms of practice they entail and assemble; consequently, communication 
theories ought to be open to second-order normative examination on such grounds. 
Craig‘s metamodel is thus a theory about theories, but it is explicitly constitutive. 
Whereas a first-order constitutive model of communication posits that the practice under 
scrutiny ―is the primary social process through which our meaningful common world is 
constructed‖, the metalevel constitutive viewpoint conceives of the field of deliberation and 
argumentation about communication theory as a debate about the practical implications of 
constituting communication itself in different ways (Craig 2007: 127-8). This entails the 
denial of an absolute reality of communication as a social practice, apart from its constitu-
tion in discourse. As Myers (2001) has noted, this is hardly a neutral standpoint, because 
the constitutive perspective is clearly employed in the very construction of the metatheory. 
One could therefore argue that such a metamodel is woefully incapable of providing a level 
playing field, as critics of constructionism are hardly likely to accept the constitutive sup-
position and join the discussion. In his reply, Craig (2001) openly acknowledges this, as 
well as the reflexive paradox which follows from adopting a thoroughly constitutive con-
ception of communication theory
4
; as he puts it, the constitutive metamodel is ―shot 
through with social constructionism‖ (Craig 2001: 235). But in a broadly pragmatic fash-
ion, Craig argues that a metamodel of the kind he has envisaged is simply the best alterna-
tive for advancing cross-paradigm debate available to us. It is in principle capable of detect-
ing something of value in traditions opposed to its fundamental premises, for every ―theory 
offers a particular way of constituting the process of communication from some practically 
                                                          
4
 In Craig‘s (2007) words, the paradox entails that the constitutive metamodel ―cannot a priori reject first-
order models of communication that contradict its own assumptions without thereby contradicting those very as-
sumptions‖ (Craig 2007: 128).  
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oriented point of view‖ (Craig 2007: 128). Not even the oft-vilified linear transmission 
models are excluded from purview, as they may provide useful ways to talk about commu-
nicative phenomena for some particular purposes.  
Consequently, the primary justification for positing a constitutive metamodel seems to 
be that it renders a broad field of communication theory possible, as some ground of com-
parison between positions that may seem to be wholly incommensurable is identified (Craig 
2001: 234). That is, Craig‘s proposal purportedly possesses the capacity to coalesce the 
troublingly divergent field of first-order theories by viewing them as different ways of con-
structing communication for real-world ends.  
 
The constitutive metamodel is useful because it gives the vast, otherwise disparate array 
of communication theories a common practical purpose to illuminate, challenge, and en-
rich everyday ways of talking about communication problems and practices. The constitu-
tive metamodel constructs a coherent field by interpreting the various theories of commu-
nication as alternative ways of constituting communication in discourse for practical pur-
poses (Craig 2007: 129). 
 
Furthermore, as suggested, the adoption of the constitutive metaperspective is also motivat-
ed instrumentally; supposedly, ―it puts at our disposal the sum total of practical value deriv-
able from every communication theory‖ (Craig 2001: 234). 
Arguably, this viewpoint indicates that the constitutive metamodel is meant to be com-
prehensive in the sense that it can identify every communication theory worthy of the name 
– although, as a heuristic device, the metamodel does not claim to cover all the work done 
in the field (Craig 2007: 139). Furthermore, Craig‘s rationale for postulating the metamodel 
also implies that his approach can explicate the crucial distinguishing factors between such 
genuine first-order models of communication – elements that he articulates in a schematic 
matrix. Each candidate perspective is then categorised according to its unique definition of 
communication, its particular conceptualisation of communication problems, its character-
istic ―metadiscursive vocabulary‖ that encompasses terms for talking about communication, 
and the ―metadiscursive commonplaces‖ or everyday assumptions about communication 
that it either affirms or challenges (Craig 2007: 129). In the second place, a bona fide mem-
ber of the matrix is expected to be capable of articulating its disagreements with the other 
approved perspectives, thus opening up the lines of argument between different approaches 
to practical problems of communication. 
In Craig‘s (1999) original presentation of the constitutive metamodel, the application of 
these principles for identifying communication theories results in seven basic perspectives – 
or, as Craig prefers to designate them, traditions – namely, the rhetorical, the semiotic, the 
phenomenological, the cybernetic, the sociopsychological, the sociocultural, and the criti-
cal. In addition, Craig acknowledges some secondary, hybrid forms, such as the poststruc-
turalist viewpoint. Furthermore, he admits that this particular matrix is only one convenient 
way of structuring the field; it is therefore always open to corrections and additions that 
would require fairly substantial adjustments of the scheme.  
 
The only restrictions on adding a tradition to the constitutive metamodel are that the pro-
posed tradition must comprise a substantial body of thought that contributes a unique, 
practically consequential conceptualization of communication, significantly different 
from all other traditions, and that it must be incorporated into the matrix of the field by 
specifying its distinctive view of communication problems, metadiscursive vocabulary, 
commonplace beliefs it affirms or challenges, and topoi for argumentation vis-à-vis other 
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traditions. Incorporating a new tradition requires that other traditions be redefined, at least 
to the extent that each of them has something to say (argumentative topoi) about the new 
tradition, and possibly in more radical ways as key ideas are reinterpreted in the new tra-
dition (Craig 2007: 130). 
 
So, although the constitutive metamodel is open to changes, such modifications must be 
performed in an orderly fashion; the way the model is actually assembled depends on pur-
poses at hand, but the freedom of construction is restricted by the requirement that each tra-
dition must be articulated in relation to the other constituents of the metamodel. In other 
words, no matter how the matrix is actually arranged, it must explicate the relevant differ-
ences between basic first-order theories with regard to the unifying question of practical 
bearings. This is basically what the constitutive metamodel claims to do: to distinguish pur-
ported central traditions of communication theory in a way that articulates their differences 
and thereby facilitates discussion between these perspectives. 
Pragmatism Delineated 
If pragmatism is to be elevated to the status of a basic communication-theoretical tradi-
tion in the metamodel matrix, it must be capable of asserting its unique conception of 
communication in the manner outlined above. According to Craig, Russill‘s (2004) identifi-
cation of the communication-theoretical quintessence of pragmatism succeeds in establish-
ing the pragmatist perspective as a tradition in the sense required, although the account in 
question falls somewhat short of a full matrix-model articulation. Russill locates the emer-
gence of a distinctive pragmatist approach to communication in William James‘s radical 
empiricism, which supposedly provides pragmatism with a unique perspective on commu-
nication problems; in Craig‘s (2007) words, ―the pragmatist tradition conceptualizes com-
munication in response to the problem of incommensurability — that is, the problem of co-
operation in a pluralistic social world characterized by the absence of common, absolute 
standards for resolving differences‖ (Craig 2007: 131). This is purportedly a neglected 
point of view. While pragmatism has influenced communication inquiry in a myriad of dif-
ferent ways over the years, the specifically pragmatist conundrum of communication as the 
―problem of incommensurabilism in modern democratic and pluralistic societies‖ has not 
been recognised as such (Russill 2004: 32). 
Next, via an interpretation of John Dewey‘s conception of a democratic public, the 
pragmatist view of communication is distinctively conceptualised in terms of triple contin-
gency and pluralism (Craig 2007: 135).  
 
A critical element in Dewey‘s theory for Russill is a triple contingency that fully situates 
communication in James‘s indeterminate, pluralistic universe. In terms of communication 
models, single contingency can be represented by a linear (A → B) model in which A 
contingently selects a message to influence B. Double contingency can be represented by 
an interactionist (A ↔ B) model in which the incommensurable perspectives of A and B 
jointly determine the message (a moment of relative sameness). Triple contingency intro-
duces a third contingent perspective that forms the context in which A and B must inter-
act. The third perspective is represented in Dewey‘s theory by a pluralistic public com-
prising incommensurable group interests. The interaction of A and B is contingent on 
their reflexive awareness of the actions and interests of various nonpresent others who 
constitute the public. Inquiry (investigation of consequences) is needed to inform that re-
flexive social awareness. ‗‗Acting intelligently, on the basis of consequences of habitual 
and prospective actions, creates a standpoint of action that is neither ego‘s nor alter‘s but 
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a third perspective‘‘ (Russill 2004: 105). Communication in society depends critically on 
Dewey‘s vision of a democratic public or pluralistic community as a context for coopera-
tive interaction across incommensurable perspectives (Craig 2007: 132). 
 
The triple-contingency or ―transactional‖ view entails a thoroughgoing contextualist turn. 
All notions of universal norms or foundational codes of communication are purportedly 
abandoned, as the pragmatist affirms that ―change and contingency go all the way down‖ 
(Russill 2004: 172). Communicative meaning is constantly constituted and renegotiated in 
three different settings of indeterminacy: individual freedom, interactive coordination, and 
social incommensurability – none of which can be neglected in an adequate account of 
communication according to this perspective. In particular, pragmatism highlights the third 
level of contingency, which in Piet Strydom‘s (2001) terms can be characterised as ―the 
contingency that the public as the bearer of a third point of view brings into communicative 
relations and hence into the social process‖ (Strydom 2001: 165). Put differently, there are 
three factors that have a constitutive impact on the social situation – the individual, the dia-
logical pair, and the public – each of which increases the complexity and the indeterminacy 
of the state of affairs. In practice, this entails that social communication can be construed as 
a continuous attempt to manage three levels of irreducible contingency of meaning – the 
possible success of which is always relative, situational, and partial. 
Consequently, Russill‘s account seems to fulfil the two most basic requirements of the 
metamodel matrix, as it provides us with a unique articulation of the problem of communi-
cation in terms of incommensurability and a distinctive conception of communication in 
terms of triple contingency. However, although Russill identifies an initial metadiscursive 
vocabulary consisting of terms such as ―democracy‖, ―publics‖, and ―criticism‖ and pro-
vides some arguments for the plausibility of the pragmatist viewpoint vis-à-vis other tradi-
tions, Craig contends that this articulation of pragmatism only partly fulfils the conditions 
of the metamodel. Russill neglects to consider metadiscursive commonplaces, does not pur-
sue a systematic criticism of the seven other traditions, and does not properly scrutinise 
how the inclusion of pragmatism in the metamodel affects the viewpoints of the other basic 
perspectives; but from Craig‘s (2007) point of view, the most serious omission is Russill‘s 
failure ―to consider a full range of topoi or lines of argument against pragmatism from the 
traditions of communication theory, including those all-important topoi for self-criticism of 
pragmatism from a pragmatist point of view‖ (Craig 2007: 135). Hence, Craig undertakes 
to complete the picture. 
In Craig‘s (2007: 136-8) version of the pragmatist tradition of communication theory, 
communication is conceptualised as pluralistic community and the ―coordination of practi-
cal activities through discourse and reflexive inquiry‖, while problems of communication 
are extended beyond incommensurability per se to include conditions that are apt to work 
against pluralistic community, such as nonparticipation, dogmatism, and defective dis-
course practices. The revised metadiscursive vocabulary includes concepts that refer to co-
ordinated management, such as ―community‖, ―pluralism‖, ―interdependence‖, ―interests‖, 
―consequences‖, ―inquiry‖, ―discourse‖, ―participation‖, and ―cooperation‖. The pragmatist 
perspective is construed as plausible when it appeals to metadiscursive commonplaces such 
as ―we need to cooperate despite our differences‖ and ―the real meaning of anything is the 
practical difference it makes‖; and it is taken to be interesting when it disputes metadiscur-
sive commonplaces such as ―there are certain truths that cannot be denied‖ and ―there can 
be no cooperation with evil or falsehood‖. 
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Furthermore, Craig (2007) asserts that a common theme running through the purported 
pragmatist critique of the other traditions is the contention that they ―attempt to restrict the 
triple contingency of communication, thereby limiting reflexivity through appeals to tradi-
tional beliefs (rhetoric), structured codes (semiotics), dialogical focus on the other (phe-
nomenology), formal models (cybernetics), causal predictions (social psychology), persis-
tent cultural patterns and social structures (sociocultural theory), and universal validity 
claims (Habermasian critical theory)‖ (Craig 2007: 138). In other words, the Craig-Russill 
conception of pragmatist communication theory also functions as a critic of the inclination 
to curb indeterminacy by postulating different kinds of universal or transcendent factors. 
However, as Craig suggests, the most interesting aspect of this analysis may be pragma-
tism‘s self-criticism, which is divided into two predicaments. Firstly, the pragmatist is pur-
portedly faced with the dilemma of reflexivity, which follows from the fact that pragmatism 
cannot be brought to fruition ―without forming institutions that inevitably routinize and rit-
ualize practices of inquiry and communication, thereby reducing contingency (the always-
temporary goal of inquiry) while rendering them nonreflexive (which inhibits inquiry)‖ 
(ibid.). On the other hand, pragmatism confronts the paradox of pluralism, because it is in 
practice adopting a ―neutral‖ stance in its advocacy of a pluralistic community, standing 
aloof from any particular interests, while at the same time theoretically denying the possi-
bility of assuming such a neutral attitude. It is this predicament that leads to Rorty‘s infa-
mous ethnocentrism; since an unbiased, universal standpoint is in principle unachievable, 
one might as well advocate the values and interests of one‘s ―ethnic‖ community (in Ror-
ty‘s case, the standards of a purported liberal America). The affirmation of ―contingency all 
the way‖ comes with a price.  
As a full-fledged tradition of communication theory in Craig‘s sense, pragmatism is also 
to be submitted to criticism from the other basic perspectives of the matrix. Frankly, these 
do not seem to pack much of a punch, which may be an indication of Craig‘s tacit pragma-
tist sympathies. However, from the point of view of critical theory, pragmatism can be ac-
cused of providing inadequate accounts of power and underestimating the significance of 
political conflict – a possible weakness that Russill (2004; 2006) has tried to remedy by in-
troducing Foucauldian perspectives into the pragmatist‘s analytical arsenal. Furthermore, in 
both the cybernetic and sociocultural topoi for argumentation against pragmatism, one finds 
the critical contention that ―pragmatism overestimates agency‖ (Craig 2007: 137). Although 
the implications of this charge are not elaborated in Craig‘s account, I believe it points to 
some characteristic difficulties for a strongly constitutive – and nominalistic – conception 
of pragmatism. 
The Significance of Tradition 
Craig‘s general outline for a meta-approach to communication theory, as well as the 
subsequent inclusion of pragmatism in the discussion, is in many respects commendable. 
Rather than indifferently embracing disciplinary diversity, Craig seeks plausible grounds 
for constructive discussion in a pluralistic environment. Moreover, he does not pursue this 
end by indiscriminately affirming the legitimacy of every theoretical perspective under the 
sun, but puts forward what is clearly a normative point of view leading to categorisations of 
and distinctions between communication theories. Although Craig wisely leaves his meta-
model open-ended and revisable, it is also exclusive, offering criteria for what may be con-
strued as appropriate first-order communication theories. Everything does not go. 
On the other hand, the benchmarks proposed by Craig provide some fairly obvious tar-
gets for criticism. Above, Myers‘s (2001) reproof of the constructionist slant of the original 
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metamodel was noted. In view of the later revisions proposed by Craig, it seems reasonable 
to add a bias for pragmatism to this picture. In fact, Craig (2007: 133; 139-40) explicitly 
acknowledges that Russill is right in holding that the constitutive metamodel is in many re-
spects a pragmatistic conception; the metamodel is a tool for tackling the problem of in-
commensurability – supposedly characteristic of a pragmatist construal of communication 
issues – in the field of communication theory. Furthermore, the metamodel adopts a prag-
matist stance as it construes theories in terms of their practical orientations and as it replac-
es truth with utility as the fundamental evaluative criterion. Although Craig‘s project pur-
portedly employs facets of all of its traditions, pragmatism belongs to the ―favoured tradi-
tions‖ that posit a first-order constitutive model of communication. However, his proposal 
is also haunted by the paradox of pluralism: although there can be no neutral metamodel, 
the model in question professes to give a fair hearing to all of the main traditions. To 
Craig‘s (2007) credit, he openly admits that the constitutive metamodel is ―a largely prag-
matist project rather closely aligned with a first-order pragmatist theory of communication, 
although it also includes and welcomes dialogue with other incommensurable approaches‖ 
(Craig 2007: 141). But it might still be too much to ask of other traditions that they should 
embrace a debate so heavily loaded in favour of a constitutive pragmatist perspective, 
which, as we shall shortly see, is in itself a contestable interpretation. 
Arguably, the attempt to find a balance between a first-order pragmatist theory of com-
munication and a comprehensive metamodel informed by pragmatism is difficult to main-
tain. The first- and second-order pragmatisms qualify each other in ways that tend to render 
both less potent and – perhaps ironically – also less practicable. It is at any rate difficult to 
see how both can be consistently maintained; according to second-order principles, a first-
order pragmatist should be prepared to accept that his or her favoured theory may in certain 
practical circumstances be inferior to its main rivals, whereas the second-order pragmatist 
should concede that his or her purportedly inclusive perspective is in fact determined by a 
restricted first-order commitment. In other words, the full-scale pragmatist must entertain 
something like a split personality, simultaneously affirming certain theoretical beliefs while 
at the same time conceding that the beliefs in question are replaceable tools. The first-level 
commitment – of whatever stripe it may be – is weakened by the broad instrumentalism of 
the meta-view.  
 Such arguments cast doubt on the overall feasibility of Craig‘s metamodel project. The 
status of second-order pragmatism as a sufficiently comprehensive vantage pointis rendered 
dubious if it is understood as a product or upshot of a first-order construction. More gener-
ally, one might also question whether practical benefit or purpose constitutes a sufficiently 
comprehensive and neutral reference point for the task at hand. In a broadly Deweyan fash-
ion, Craig does away with the theory/practice dualism. In this process, communication the-
ories tend to become mere tools in the service of a somewhat nebulous sphere of social 
practice; but in order to pack any punch, this account must assume that ―practical aims‖ are 
commensurable enough to provide a common ground for productive dialogue. A critic 
could plausibly inject that ―practice‖ is in fact highly abstract and heavily theory-laden con-
ception. In fact, as a constructionist, Craig ought to agree. But this threatens the metamodel 
with a potentially debilitating circularity, and the appeal to pragmatism does not provide 
any respite from this difficulty. 
The problem of the status of pragmatism in Craig‘s metamodel can also be approached 
from a different angle. Namely, rather than describing and elucidating anything recognisa-
ble as a full pragmatist tradition, his proposal amounts to a particular rendering of the 
communicative gist of pragmatism. Admittedly, the notion of pragmatism as one tradition 
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is highly contestable, as is the meaning and upshot of the concept of ―tradition‖, leaving 
plenty of room of varying interpretations. Yet, I believe it is fair to say that such references 
to a tradition are typically understood as entailing a (possibly plural) history and (possibly 
conflicting) personalities. In this light, Craig‘s conception of a ―tradition‖ turns out to be a 
rather peculiar one. While Russill strives to establish the historical roots of the pragmatist 
conception of communication – as one might expect of a reconstruction of a tradition – 
Craig‘s constitutive metamodel tends to be synchronic rather than diachronic. Not only is 
the presentation of the traditions included in the metamodel markedly ahistorical; it is also 
difficult to shake the suspicion that the metatheoretical matrix is a something of a procrus-
tean bed for communication theories. True, the metamodel is construed as a tool for limited 
purposes, which does not even attempt to capture all the relevant work in the field; but it 
nonetheless postulates rather strict criteria for traditionhood. Thus, the question of whether 
the proposed demarcation of the quintessence of pragmatist communication theory consti-
tutes a tradition in any pertinent sense at all ought to be raised. In other words, in order to 
legitimise the talk of a ―tradition‖ we should be able to identify a substantial number of ac-
tual pragmatist communication theorists; one or two self-professed pragmatists does not a 
tradition make. 
Craig provides a partial and somewhat unsatisfying answer to such worries. Based on 
the criteria he has established, he argues for the inclusion of communication scholars James 
Carey and Stanley Deetz in the broader circle of pragmatism, while ―coordinated manage-
ment of meaning‖ is singled out as a particularly pure representative of the breed (Craig 
2007: 134). Thus, there would seem to be at least some bona fide pragmatists out there in 
the field. Yet, it feels a bit farfetched to speak of a ―tradition‖ in this case, especially as 
―pragmatist‖ may not be part of the identified scholars‘ primary self-identities. What seems 
to be on offer is more like a normatively constitutive paradigm. That is, it is less a matter of 
an actual historical practice and more of a postulation of a demarcating standard.  
However, putting aside these misgivings regarding the terminological fitness of ―tradi-
tion‖ in this context, one might argue that such concerns are ultimately trivial and beside 
the point, as we are not primarily concerned with intellectual history, but rather with the 
advancement of communication theory. In response, I would contend that the particular de-
lineation of pragmatism proposed by Craig, if taken seriously as an intellectual guiding 
light, may have the adverse effect of denying communication theory the full access to 
pragmatism as a living philosophical and social-scientific tradition of thought. Although 
ostensibly rooted in the work of James and Dewey (as construed by Russill), Craig‘s con-
ception of pragmatism does not call for a fuller engagement with their thought, and in effect 
discounts parallel or alternative strands emerging from other pragmatist thinkers. Ironically, 
in spite of its professed pluralism, the metamodel conception of pragmatism can be reduc-
tive, in effect excluding several vital facets of the broader pragmatist tradition – including 
its sometimes penetrating intra-tradition disputes. 
This is an intricate proposition – one which I cannot fully develop in this brief review. 
However, for our purposes, it is sufficient to identify at least some potentially valuable in-
gredients of pragmatism that could contribute to the development of the communication-
theoretical project, but which may be barred by Craig‘s conception. In conclusion, I will 
therefore identify three such aspects that I believe to be either obscured or excluded by the 
metamodel demarcation. 
One key discussion within pragmatism that ought to be of significance to communica-
tion theory – and communication studies more broadly – concerns the nature of inquiry in 
general and scientific inquiry in particular. Significantly, the original notion of pragmatism 
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emerges precisely from C. S. Peirce‘s (1877) radical conception of inquiry as a natural 
striving to resolve such doubts that emerge in everyday life and to replace them with opti-
mally functional belief-habits, in addition to his characterisation of the principal hypothesis 
of the generic scientific method of settling doubts in terms of realism – the latter entailing 
that scientific inquiry implicates the hope that any particular question we may pursuing 
would receive a definite answer, were the investigation carried out to fruition. That is, the 
Peircean model of inquiry is on the one hand articulated in terms of a tendency to respond 
to naturally and socially compelled doubts, which are interpreted as dysfunctions or inade-
quacies in the habits of action that underlie our belief-systems, so that ―the sole object of 
inquiry is the settlement of opinion‖ (CP 5.375); but on the other hand, this belief-doubt-
inquiry-belief cycle tends to evolve into science understood broadly as a social quest for 
truth (pragmatically equivalent to a belief-habit that would stand, no matter what).  
This belief-doubt model is reinterpreted by Dewey (LW 12) in terms of a process by 
which indeterminate situations are identified as problematic and eventually rendered deter-
minate. However, in contrast to Peirce, who stresses the pursuit of truth, Dewey emphasises 
the transformative aspect of inquiry; it is not primarily a matter of adjusting individual and 
subjective habits to accord with reality, but rather a holistic and dynamic process by which 
entire situations (or contexts) are transformed. Successful inquiry does not entail individual 
satisfaction; it implies objective changes. But for Dewey, methodical inquiry is not ulti-
mately undertaken to obtain objective knowledge, but to re-organize and improve human 
life. In other words, Dewey‘s project is unambiguously melioristic. 
Given these divergent emphases, it is not surprising that Peirce‘s and Dewey‘s concep-
tions of inquiry and science are sometimes explicitly pitted against each other (e.g., Sleeper 
1986; Talisse 2002). However, this should not lead us to overlook the substantial similari-
ties between these pragmatist outlooks; at heart, the Peircean and Deweyan perspectives 
agree in replacing the ancient philosophical concern with knowledge with a dynamic con-
ception of inquiry. Their emphasis on scientific method differs markedly from the kind of 
―conversationalism‖ associated with Rorty (and accepted by Carey). Rortyan neopragma-
tists tend to treat the focus on inquiry as a suspect remnant of scientism, without due con-
sideration for the deep epistemological significance of the concept for the classical pragma-
tists.And although I cannot develop this argument at all here, there are certain reasons to 
maintain that the apparent divergence between Peirce and Dewey is not as wide as it may at 
first seem. Both of their perspectives can in the end be interpreted as laboratory approaches 
focused on the development of individual and social habits of action. The most pregnant 
point of contention may be Dewey‘s insistence that philosophy ought to turn its attention to 
the concrete problems of this world with the explicit intention of remedying particular so-
cial problems; Peirce argues for the need to protect the autonomy of science (including phi-
losophy) from utilitarian demands, and would be quite critical of a rationalistic proposal to 
treat human society as a social-scientific workshop.  
I believe that such on-going intra-tradition discussions can be of great value for the 
communication disciplines, given their inclination toward self-probing. The articulation of 
the similarities and differences between Peirce‘s and Dewey‘s respective views – and the 
divergence of both from the neopragmatist stance – may cast new light on the tricky ques-
tion of what kinds of inquiry communication studies and communication theory actually are 
or can be. Perhaps going against the grain, I predict that the upshot of the inquiry into 
pragmatistic inquiry may provide us with reasons to curb the tendency toward constructiv-
ist/constructionist standpoints, enhancing not only our melioristic sensibilities, but also 
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deepening our understanding of the limits of transformation and the significance of social 
habits (surely the main ingredients of a tradition, be it good or bad).  
These considerations carry us to another, perhaps more clearly problematic aspect of 
Craig‘s demarcation of pragmatism. As noted, Craig tends to assume that pragmatism is 
straightforwardly well-matched with what he calls ―the constitutive point of view‖ or simp-
ly ―constructionism‖, in effect leaning toward an instrumentalist rejection of realism. But 
while it is true that pragmatism is often associated with various strands of construct-
thought, and that the term ―instrumentalism‖ can be traced to Dewey, this focus on the 
transformative side of things conceals the extent to which core pragmatists – Peirce and 
Dewey, in particular – conceive of themselves as realists in contrast to nominalists and rela-
tivists. In fact, after notoriously attempting to distinguish his ―pragmaticism‖ from other 
brands of pragmatism,5 Peirce quite perceptively lists a series of core ―truths‖ purportedly 
accepted by all pragmatists in the broader sense of the word. Notably, these include the 
―acknowledgment that there are, in a Pragmatistical sense, Real habits (which Really would 
produce effects, under circumstances that may not happen to get actualized, and are thus 
Real generals)‖ and the ―insistence upon interpreting all hypostatic abstractions in terms of 
what they would or might (not actually will) come to in the concrete‖ (CP 6.485). This hab-
it-realism (or ―scholastic‖ realism liberally interpreted), and its accompanying conception 
of the pragmatistic import of abstractions, is what the realism of pragmatism most generally 
amounts to. In Dewey‘s reading, such a realist stance is not only compatible with a moder-
ate transformative perspective, but its very basis (LW 11:108 n. 4).  
I do not think Craig necessarily needs to reject a realism of this kind, as it is in fact 
largely in tune with his conception of the normative implication of practices; but in con-
junction with the constitutive perspective, his nominal demarcation tends to pit pragmatism 
against realism in a way that muddles matters and produces pseudo-problems for the hypo-
thetical communication-theoretical pragmatist. Recall how Craig characterises the ―dilem-
ma of reflexivity‖ plaguing pragmatist inquiry: it leads to habits (routines, rituals, etc.) of 
inquiry and communication that reduce contingency but render them nonreflexive (thereby 
inhibiting inquiry). From a Peircean-Deweyan point of view, this entails an undeservedly 
negative assessment of habit. Without real habits – that is, habits of action that truly work, 
as many of our ways of doing things seem to do – inquiry is not even possible. Instead of 
treating habitualisation as an obstacle to inquiry, it is more appropriate to view optimally 
functional habits as enablers of inquiry. Or, to put the matter differently, the pragmatist af-
firms the real (pragmatic) efficacy of habits (including theoretical concepts) – their conse-
quentiality – and is therefore normatively faced with the constant challenge of producing 
the habits most conducive to inquiry and amelioration. In a sense, this broad kind of realism 
can embrace a moderate ―constructionism‖, as inquiry entails the transformation of (real) 
habits; but it does not imply that belief-habits would be nothing but constructions of dis-
course or inquiry.  
My final – and perhaps most pregnant – critical observation is that Craig‘s metamodel 
tends to disconnect pragmatism from other ―traditions‖ in a way that may not be conducive 
to the stated objectives of his project. No doubt, the same point could be made with refer-
                                                          
5
 Peirce‘s ―pragmaticism‖ is frequently misinterpreted as a full-scale rejection of the pragmatisms of James 
and F. C. S. Schiller by both Peirceans and anti-Peircean pragmatists. In fact, Peirce original introduction of the 
―ugly‖ concept clearly indicated that the ―lawless rovers‖ that caused him concern were not his fellow-pragmatists, 
but certain unnamed writers in literary journals who misused the concept of ―pragmatism‖. Yet, it is true that 
Peirce was critical of nominalistic and anti-logical tendencies in James and Schiller; at least once (MS 289: 11, 
c.1905), he referred to such thinkers as ―neopragmatists‖ – perhaps the first use of that particular term.  
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ence to many of the principal approaches he identifies, but the adverse consequences of the 
severance may be most tangible in the case of semiotics and pragmatism. Namely, as Craig 
identifies distinctive semiotic and pragmatist traditions, he in effect obscures the fact that 
these approaches have common roots in Peirce‘s rejection of Cartesianism. More than that, 
from a Peircean point of view, pragmatism cannot be straightforwardly removed from its 
semiotic context without losing something vital. By identifying the semiotic and the prag-
matistic as independent traditions in communication theory, Craig seems to leave no place 
for the Peircean point of view, where pragmatism is primarily a theory of the clarification 
of meaning, closely aligned to a permeating semiotic point of view as well as a variant of 
common-sensist philosophy. This impression is rendered even stronger by Craig‘s decisive-
ly social-theoretic starting point, which seems to exclude questions pertaining to communi-
cation (or communication-like processes and phenomena) beyond the realm of the strictly 
social. For a semiotician of Peirce‘s stripe – and not incidentally, also for pragmatists like 
Dewey and George H. Mead – such philosophical issues should not be excluded from the 
purview of communication theory on the basis of disciplinary postulation. 
Craig seems to have an answer handy to the worry about separating the pragmatistic 
from the semiotic tradition: Peirce‘s position may be construed as a hybrid, including ele-
ments from both traditions. However, this will not work, as Craig defines traditions as mu-
tually incommensurable, with only ―practice‖ providing a common point of reference. What 
his account will inevitably miss and exclude is the Peircean conception of a profound inter-
connection between the semiotic and the pragmatistic; and thereby the metamodel arguably 
fails to cover the full range of communication-theoretical options in the way promised. Part 
of the trouble is the rather unfortunate use of ―incommensurable‖ in this context, which 
tends to turn Craig‘s traditions into mere instruments for solving particular practical prob-
lems of social communication. While such an approach may superficially appear to be in 
line with Deweyan ―instrumentalism‖, it in effect postulates that the first-order practitioner 
of communication studies has a more or less definite set of discrete implements at his or her 
disposal – a toolbox from which this or that conceptual framework or intellectual instru-
ment may be picked as need arises.  
In a sense, Craig‘s own partialities demonstrate why such an eclectic approach is not 
feasible. Whether due to logical or psychological constraints, human inquirers – even on a 
purported metalevel – tend to look for coherent explanations and interpretations, although 
perfect consistency is always beyond mortal reach. Consequently, Craig must acknowledge 
that he views the bigger picture – the meta-metalevel – from some perspective, be it con-
structionist or pragmatist. As noted, he is open about his biases; but he does not appropri-
ately recognise that this renders his postulation of incommensurable traditions incongruous, 
as he does not seem to find it all that difficult to explicate them within one framework of 
communication. For plausibility‘s sake, it might have been better if Craig – in good prag-
matist fashion – would have chosen to stand more solidly behind his first-order beliefs 
while generally acknowledging the fallibility of all such perspectives. 
To a large extent, the problems identified above are attributable to an attempt to main-
tain a degree of impartiality on the metalevel while at the same time acknowledging that no 
such pluralistic neutrality is pragmatically possible (and perhaps not even desirable) in view 
of first-level commitments. Craig‘s project sets out from the premise that genuine commu-
nication-theoretical paradigms are incommensurable and then moves on to postulate theo-
retical demarcations of major traditions that affirm this proposition. The justification for 
this move is that it should on the one hand elucidate the main alternatives in the field and 
on the other hand promote discussion between otherwise fenced-in perspectives. In my 
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judgment, Craig‘s model does make a genuine contribution to the pragmatic clarification of 
certain major theoretical positions, although the identification of these as ―traditions‖ is not 
altogether viable. If it is further acknowledged that the purported ―pragmatist tradition‖ of 
communication theory is more accurately identified as a specific variant of pragmatism, 
then Craig‘s account provides a welcome opening for scrutiny of certain potential contribu-
tions of the broader pragmatist tradition to communication theory. But I feel that there is 
little to be gained in defining the pragmatist tradition along the lines drafted by Craig.6 
With regard to the aim of promoting discussion between communication-theoretical tra-
ditions, the proposal may serve a valuable function in instigating broader debate about the 
nature and scope of different theoretical perspectives, but I do not foresee a productive dia-
logue as envisaged by Craig. If one accepts his incommensurabilist premise, but rejects the 
constitutive and instrumentalistic principles underlying the metamodel on first-order 
grounds, then meaningful exchange and cross-paradigm fertilisation ends up being both 
theoretically and practically impossible. That is, a non-pragmatist reading of the model on 
the metalevel would produce clearly defined but ultimately isolated pockets of theory on 
the ground. Inquiry would be blocked. But of course the reality of the field is more com-
plex, confusing, and fecund than this schematic model would suggest. The way forward, I 
believe, is not the elevation of the researcher to a constitutive-pragmatist metalevel, but ra-
ther the investigation of the ways in which pragmatist philosophy may provide better (or 
worse) platforms for explicating communicative phenomena and developing communica-
tive habits than its alternatives. 
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